

A IN5

Armamentismo y políticas militares. Fabricación y venta de armas. 1971.

Docs.23

El expediente contiene notas de diarios, páginas de revistas, documentos y cables acerca del armamentismo en el mundo, la carrera armamentista, gastos militares. Producción, venta y compra, exportación e importación de armas. Tráfico ilegal de armas. Políticas en materia de armamentismo. 1971

Clave expediente A IN5

Fondo A

Volumen

Año de publicación 1971

Año final 1971

Sección temática 1971


Serie geográfica 1971

Sección relacionada

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Observaciones Recortes y páginas de diarios, páginas de revistas y cables

Fuente Gregorio Selser



stan, India complained loudly.

But when France sold Pakistan three submarines and 54 latest-type Mirage jets, complaint from India was barely audible.

Britain only talked about resuming arms sales to white-ruled South Africa, and it created an uproar from black African states.

HARDLY A PEEP

Yet France last year wrote \$460 million in orders for arms sales to South Africa — fighter planes, armored cars, helicopters, submarines. And black Africa hardly peeped.

Even when South African Prime Minister Balthazar John Vorster came to Paris on an official visit, there were no demonstrations, no shouting in the streets.

What is the secret of France's relative freedom from protest over its arms sales?

Former French President Charles de Gaulle, asserting the total independence of French policy, opposed the United States on many points, but at the same time did not go along with the Soviet Union. This pleased the "third world," which includes the Africans.

France cut off arms sales to Israel, branding the Jewish state an "aggressor" in its dispute with the Arabs. This pleased the Arabs, and while Paris lost the ready Jewish weapons market, it picked up substantial arms contracts from the Arabs. Libya last

rica to accept the South Africa arms sales by saying its policy is not to sell arms to nations which have been condemned by the United Nations for aggression, and whatever South Africa's internal race policies are, South Africa has committed no outside aggression. Therefore, France is free to sell South Africa weapons.

Defense Minister Michel Debre insists France would not supply guerrilla weapons, nor antiguerrilla weapons, nor aircraft for ground attacks.

Yet Britain's intent was to sell South Africa only warships to help patrol its coasts from possible Russian danger.

A further reason for France's unhindered arms sales is that Mr. Pompidou's party controls the legislative bodies here, and there is little opposition or open criticism from those who do disapprove.

Defense Secretary Melvin R. Laird, on a recent visit to Paris, said that the French are "very good international salesmen" of their arms and have public support for favorable credit terms granted to the buying countries. He said the United States cannot compete with the French on some of these arms deals, primarily in Latin America, because Congress has not authorized similar low-interest rates on credit extended by the United States to arms buyers.

year signed up to buy more than 100 expensive jets.

France gave independence to 14 former colonies in Africa. But it still helps most of them economically. And in many of them, Paris wields wide influence.

Enun/18/71

Los Angeles Times MONDAY, JAN. 18, 1971

Rueful U.S. Pays
Tribute to French
Arms Sales RecordBY DON COOK
Times Staff Writer

PARIS—When Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird visited Paris recently, he paid rueful tribute under press conference questioning to the "highly efficient business methods" and low credit terms by which France is boosting its arms sales around the world.

The full returns for 1970 are now in—and Laird had every reason for his ironic praise. French arms sales soared to 1.3 billion last year, almost triple the 1960 total, placing France third in the league of world arms suppliers after the United States (approximately \$3 billion annual sales) and the Soviet Union (an estimate \$2 billion).

Arms now amount to 8% of France's total exports, and overseas orders are keeping an estimated 100,000 French workers on the payroll in armament industries. The most spectacular successes in 1970 were in aircraft sales of \$200 million in which France has now shot well ahead of Great Britain. But the French have also chalked up a huge jump in sales of naval equipment: patrol boats and frigates, as well as electronics and ground-forces equipment.

Moreover, much of the French success in 1970 has been at the direct expense of the United States—particularly in Latin America with sales of the Mirage supersonic fighter-bomber. For years it has been the prudent policy of the United States to cool down South American ardor for supersonic planes, encourage governments to settle for cheaper and less sophisticated subsonic aircraft which can cope with revolutions as well as anything, and spend their money on social and economic development.

But political cynicism has been as important as cheap credit terms and efficient business methods in the French arms drive. They have happily stepped into the sales vacuum which the American "embargo" created, and have now sold Mirages to Brazil, Peru, Colombia and Argentina.

Had the United States Air Force as part of the been ready or willing to deal.

The French have joyfully sold this backward people more Mirages than they have sold to Belgium (72), Spain (30), Pakistan (30), South Africa (45), Brazil (16), Colombia (18), Argentina (14) and Peru (16). But whatever the success for the Dassault order-book, the crude realities of Libya and its people are such that it has always been seriously doubted by non-French political and industrial experts that the order for 110 Mirages will ever be completed. At best, the Libyans might be able to absorb a dozen or so aircraft over the next few years, but even this figure seems doubtful unless the French are ready to take over virtually all of the maintenance as well.

Political Cynicism

The Libyan deal for an incredible total of 110 Mirages, was announced in Paris almost exactly one year ago in a chorus of Gaullist self-congratulations. But it struck nobody who had any knowledge or experience of that backward and pathetic little nation of barely 2 million people as a piece of bare-faced cynicism on the part of the French. Or, money the Libyans have got, but educated citizens who can fly supersonic aircraft or even change spark plugs they have not got.

At over \$1 million apiece for the Mirages, the deal of course looks great on the French order books. But in fact, one year later, not one single Mirage has yet been delivered to Libya and the French are laboriously trying to teach five Libyans—the only qualified men they have been able to find in a year—to fly.

Meanwhile, Libya, having forced the Americans out of gigantic Wheelus Field, is now faced with the fact that it does not even have men of sufficient skill to maintain eight Northrop F-5 fighters which were obtained in the days when relations with the United States were good and which had been serviced by the U.S.

Anges, said it has acquired Dynamic Industries, Covina, for an undisclosed amount of common stock. Dynamic Industries is a plastics manufacturer of leisure time products. Mirages, over 100 armored vehicles, three submarines and a wide assortment of missiles and sophisticated weaponry. The helicopters in particular are of enormous value to the South African regime in enforcing its apartheid policy which is so loathsome to the rest of Africa and most of the rest of the world. But in moving into the vacuum left by Britain's 1965 arms embargo against South Africa, the French have scarcely heard one word of protest from their own former African colonies—who are perhaps too dependent on French aid themselves to speak up too loudly on the subject.

Economic Windfall

French cynicism in arms deals does not stop with politics either. In the case of credit terms, the French for example made a deal with Spain for 7% financing over a 7-year period of an order for thirty Mirages with the added plan that they would be partially assembled on a Spanish production line.

In general, the United States is usually able to meet or come fairly close to meeting the credit competition with the French, but it is pretty hard to beat sales in which a political decision is a key element. In this sphere the French seem to be able to get away with decisions no other government would dare try—beginning with President Charles De Gaulle's abrupt suspension of all arms for Israel at the height of the 6-day war in 1967.

In South Africa, for example, the French have sold 116 helicopters, 45

Tanger Acquisition

Tanger Industries, Los

24 de Febrero de 1971

FOR
Negativa

WASHINGTON, 23 (AP). — El jefe del estado mayor conjunto norteamericano, almirante Thomas H. Moorer, declaró hoy que se opone a toda restricción al uso de armamentos nucleares de Estados Unidos en América latina.

El jefe naval afirmó que semejante restricción podría tener un efecto adverso sobre los intereses de la seguri-

dad estadounidense.

Moorer prestó declaración ante el Comité de Relaciones Exteriores del Senado, en apoyo de la ratificación de una enmienda, conocida como protocolo adicionales, al tratado sobre la prohibición de armas nucleares en América latina.

Estados Unidos no forma parte del tratado, pero de conformidad con los términos del protocolo adicionales, respetaría los objetivos del convenio.

En su respuesta a preguntas del senador

John Sparkman, de Alabama, Moorer dijo oponerse a una restricción incondicional al uso de las armas nucleares, porque ello colocaría a Estados Unidos en una situación desventajosa en el caso de un enfrentamiento con un país latinoamericano que pudiera adquirir capacidad nuclear en el futuro.

Venta de armas

26/2/71

ERA INEVITABLE que la decisión británica de reiniciar la venta de armas a África del Sur provocara indignadas reacciones en África negra y en las Naciones Unidas. Los africanos saben bien que los helicópteros son más útiles como arma antisubversiva que como auxiliares navales. Si pueden localizar submarinos también pueden perseguir guerrilleros africanos.

Evidentemente el gobierno conservador de Gran Bretaña ha decidido no restringir al mercado interno su doctrina de aguerrido individualismo. También lo está exportando a la fuerza a sus asociados de la Comunidad y asimismo, a sus aliados occidentales. Probablemente Edward Heath tenga razón al decir que está harto de que a Gran Bretaña la zarandejen países sin importancia: pero podría haber elegido un modo más rescatable de demostrar ese sentido de independencia.

De todos modos es probable que la estrategia grande —tipificada por el razonamiento que tal vez haya que aliarse con la racista África del Sur en la lucha contra el monstruo expansionista de la Unión Soviética— haya sido menos importante para Heath que la necesidad de hacerse de plata contante y sonante.

El gobierno británico se siente comprensiblemente molesto por la facilidad con que Francia vende armas a quien quiera sin que sus ex colonias insinúen siquiera un murmullo de protesta. Cada vez que se lleva al tapete la cuestión de armas para África del Sur, se ejerce simultáneamente una fuerte acción diplomática sobre Gran Bretaña. Hubo un marcado contraste entre la recepción que el Presidente Pompidou tuvo en las obsequiosas ex colonias francesas, y las perdigonadas diplomáticas a que fueron sujetos Heath y Sir Alec Douglas-Home en Singapur.

Gran Bretaña ha estado perdiendo terreno rápidamente en la lucha por venderle armas a los países que o bien son demasiado subdesarrollados para necesitarlas salvo por cuestiones de imagen o bien pueden comprarlas pero las necesitan para sojuzgar rebeliones completamente justificables. En 1969 Gran Bretaña ocupó el tercer lugar en esta miserable carrera comercial. Ahora Francia vende más del doble de material bélico que Gran Bretaña —incluyendo ventas de más de cien helicópteros a África del Sur en los últimos seis años—. Uno de esos modelos —el Puma SA-330 antiguerrillero— ya ha demostrado su eficacia en la acción desarrollada en las rebeldes colonias portuguesas en África.

No es razonable pedirle a Heath que deje de lado este mercado por motivos puramente morales cuando otros paí-

ses han podido actuar sin el menor escrúpulo. Tal vez las protestas contra la decisión de vender armas a África del Sur significan que la Comunidad espera de Gran Bretaña pautas éticas más elevadas que las que es dable vaticinar de parte de otros vendedores de armamentos. Si es así, el señor Heath les ha asestado un rudo golpe a sus ilusiones.

LA turns to Europe for arms

by JOSEPH NOVITSKI

Quito

All over South America, nations that for 20 years planned, trained and equipped their armed forces with U.S. guidance and supplies have recently been ordering jet interceptors and warships, automatic weapons and tanks from Western Europe.

The prohibition established by Congress six years ago on United States sales of advanced weaponry to Latin American nations has not prevented — as it was designed to do — the expansion and modernization of South American armed forces. The trend toward acquiring weapons outside the U.S. has become solidly established since Peru ordered a squadron of Mirage jet fighters from France four years ago.

The trend has developed from a complex of motivations and pressures. Most important, perhaps, is national defence.

The claim to jurisdiction over the ocean for 200 nautical miles from the coasts of Ecuador, Peru, Chile, Argentina, Uruguay and Brazil appears meaningless unless there are means to enforce respect for it.

In several countries, furthermore, there have been pressures from younger officers to buy the equipment that their training has told them they should use. And there is the momentum of military technology itself.

More recently, another trend has become increasingly apparent: a sharp decline in U.S. military influence in South America at a time when five of the 11 independent nations on the continent have military governments. U.S. military missions have been expelled from Peru and Ecuador. In every other South American country the missions have been cut down as assistance funds have dwindled.

Since Peru's purchase of Mirages, Brazil, Argentina and Colombia have ordered the French-built planes. Argentina, Peru and Ecuador have bought French-built tanks. Brazil has

ordered warships from Britain, and Peru and Ecuador have bought armed patrol craft from West Germany. None of these could have been bought in the United States, because of a provision of the federal law enacted to encourage Latin-American nations to spend money on economic development and social reforms rather than on arms. (N.Y. Times)

THE WASHINGTON POST Sunday, May 30, 1971

Soviet Foreign Aid: Learning the Hard Way

By Dusko Doder
Washington Post Staff Writer

When they entered foreign aid business, the Russians were eager to please. They started with glamorous projects — steel mills and dams, sports stadiums and hotels — which soon became spectacular symbols of the Soviet presence in Asia and Africa.

Since 1954, the Soviet Union has extended an estimated \$7.2 billion in economic aid — and an equal amount in military assistance — to 45 developing nations.

According to U.S. analysts, the Soviets have become a much tighter with their purse over the past five years, changing the nature and thrust of their foreign aid program.

A once dynamic, even breathtaking Soviet program boldly vying for the favor of the underdeveloped world has given way to a low-keyed, businesslike and cautious effort. Low-interest loans now heavily outnumber outright grants, and U.S. officials say that actual aid deliveries continue to decline for the sixth straight year.

What has caused this entrenchment? How successful was the Soviet foreign aid effort? In which direction is it moving now?

Lessons of Aid Programs

In the global struggle for influence with the United States, the Russians obviously have discovered — as have Americans — that aid does not mean domination. They also have discovered that they have to continue their aid in order to protect earlier investments. In short, Moscow is searching for cheapest ways to achieve maximum effect.

Looking back from today's vantage point, Soviet foreign aid was neither the roaring success that some Westerners feared in the early 1960s, nor the dismal

failure that many had expected and hoped it would be when the Russians for the first time entered new nations carved out of the former European colonial empires.

On balance, Soviet successes seem to outnumber their failures. While the money did not convert new nations to communism, it gained numerous advantages for the Kremlin and extended its influence around the globe.

But the price has been high, especially since many domestic projects were held up for lack of money, and the investment remains precarious.

No Official Figures

An assessment of Soviet aid is made difficult by the absence of official figures. Economic aid to developing nations is usually announced in public, but actual deliveries are kept secret.

Economic aid pledges reached their peak in 1966, when they totaled \$1.25 billion. Since then, they have been declining, and they amounted to \$294 million in 1970.

This leveling off, according to U.S. experts, was caused not only by the changes in the program but by huge military assistance programs to North Vietnam and Egypt. Following the Six-Day War of June 1967, Egypt has received an estimated \$2.7 billion in military aid from Moscow. Soviet aid to Hanoi exceeds \$1 billion a year.

The veil of secrecy seems to benefit the Soviets — their spectacular achievements in India, Egypt and Africa, for example, overshadowed their unannounced shortcomings.

Soviets' Top Ten

The 10 top recipients of Soviet economic aid in the 1954-70 period include India (\$1.6 billion), Egypt (\$1.1 billion), Afghanistan (\$700

million), Iran (\$562 million), Turkey (\$327 million), Indonesia (\$372 million), Iraq (\$327 million), Pakistan (\$265 million), Syria (\$243 million) and Algeria (\$232 million).

The Soviet Union's entire economic aid to black Africa for the same period was somewhat over \$1 billion, with Guinea receiving \$165 million. Even though such outlays as the \$56 million in aid granted to Mali may appear insignificant, they are large in the context of African economy.

Latin America has received a total of \$300 million

News Analysis

in Soviet aid since 1954, with Brazil and Argentina getting \$100 million each. But this program is fairly new, since it's only in the past five years that the Soviets established relations with several Latin countries.

Only last month the Soviets used the 14th annual meeting of the U.N. Economic Commission for Latin America as a forum to offer technical and other aid to Latin America.

Latin American Example

Moscow's interest in Latin America is illustrative of changes in the Soviet program. By extending credits to Latin American countries, the Soviets are trying to finance their trade with the area. The Soviets have been running annual trade deficits, and Latin America's hard currencies could be used to offset these deficits.

U.S. specialists also noted that repayment terms on Soviet loans are getting harder, while interest rates were "inching up." Yet both are easier than normal Western loans. In addition, the Russians have slowed down their promotional campaign and their concentration on spectacular projects.

Early in their programs, the Soviets assumed the financial and physical commitments to build the \$500 million Aswan High Dam on

the Nile after the United States and the World Bank had refused to participate in the project.

The Aswan, and other industrial projects such as the Bhilai and Bokaro steel mills in India and the Helwan steel complex in Egypt, are regarded as triumphs of Soviet economic aid because they not only make political and psychological impact on the receiving nations, but also produce visible results for them.

In the early days of the program, however, the Soviets built projects which made no direct economic contributions to recipient nations' economies.

Often, the Soviets were not able to supply all the equipment these projects required. Some of the Soviet-built hotels in Burma and Guinea, for instance, are equipped by Otis elevators and Westinghouse air conditioners. Many Westerners have noted that the workmanship and efficiency that the Soviets put into these projects are better than one finds in similar projects in Russia itself.

Moscow's P.R. Excesses

In the area of public relations, the Soviets clearly surpassed the Americans from the beginning. While hardly anyone knows much about such U.S. aid accomplishments as the Volta Dam in Ghana or the Sanra-vati Dam in India, several Soviet projects have almost become household words.

Yet, the Soviet aid program did not assure Soviet domination over developing countries, just as earlier aid to the Communist regimes in Yugoslavia, China, Rumania and Albania failed to assure Moscow's domination of the world Communist movement.

During the Cuban missile crisis in 1962, the Russians got a painful reminder that aid does not equal domination when Guinea, a recipient country, denied them permission to land Cuba-

(Continued)

Soviet Foreign Aid (Continued)

3d/3/71

bound planes at the Conakry airport, which was built by the Russians.

While receiving Soviet aid, the regimes in Egypt and Iraq have repressed local Communists. Although millions of dollars secured for the Russians a strong foothold in the Middle East, the extent of their precarious influence on Arab countries can be changed overnight.

By giving aid to India and Pakistan, Ethiopia and Somalia, the Russians became embroiled in neighboring jealousies.

Resentment at Home

In addition, Soviet citizens resent the fact that commodities not available on the Soviet market are being shipped to Asia, Africa and Latin America.

All these considerations may have brought about the retrenchment of the past years. The Soviets have clearly learned much. Now they want to finance economic projects on purely commercial terms, but they cannot abandon their foreign aid program.

Soviet failures are little known. Moving too quickly, the Russians built a radio

have been corrected. Despite all the difficulties, the economic aid program provides Moscow with a substantial leverage in international affairs. By providing an alternative to Western aid, the Soviet program in effect created a climate in which anti-Western neutralism is possible.

At the same time, there are about 10,000 Soviet experts around the world propagating Soviet equipment and spreading goodwill. These experts are an important part of the program. Soviet projects are often cheaper simply because a highly trained Soviet specialist can work in Africa for \$200 a month while his American counterpart would require a monthly salary of \$2,000.

Since Khrushchev often overcommitted the nation, the Russians would stand to lose their huge investment if they abandoned foreign aid now—and in addition, they would arouse a deep bitterness among the nations they cut off in their struggle with the United States for global influence, the Soviets obviously do not want to leave the arena.

One measure of Moscow's success in switching to com-

station for Guinea on a hill which turned out to be rich in iron ore, which made the station's transmission poor.

The Russians also did not escape the difficulties inherent in foreign aid: Due to poor logistics and bad packaging, Soviet equipment is often damaged in transit, a difficulty compounded by lack of sophisticated equipment to make repairs in faraway places.

There were instances when poor packaging led to the hardening of Soviet cement shipped to Africa. Equipment not adjusted to the requirements of tropical climates broke down easily.

Bureaucratic snags, particularly during Nikita Khrushchev's rule, were numerous. In one case, sophisticated equipment for Indonesia's Tjilegan steel mill arrived months before the basic components.

Substantial Leverage

Many of such problems

mercial ventures was disclosed in preliminary trade figures on Russian trade turnover with less developed nations. The figures, compiled by the State Department, show an increase of half a billion dollars, from \$1.8 billion in 1966 to \$2.3 billion in 1969.

CHINE

PAR WILFRED BURCHETT

UNE ARMÉE ANTIMILITARISTE

Wilfred Burchett a pu voir le rôle joué en Chine par l'Armée de Libération populaire. C'est véritablement une armée pas comme les autres.



Une patrouille de l'Armée de Libération popula-

■ Le voyageur qui visite actuellement la Chine populaire et qui voudrait « démontrer » que ce pays est devenu « militariste » ne manquerait sans doute pas d'« arguments » pour soutenir sa thèse — tout au moins superficiellement.

En effet, l'Armée de Libération populaire (A.L.P.) est partout. Il y a au moins un représentant de l'armée dans chaque comité révolutionnaire. Il en est même, assez souvent, le président.

Il y en a dans tous les établissements scolaires, dans les communes populaires et les usines que j'ai visités. Il en est de même dans tous les comités révolutionnaires, lesquels dirigent maintenant l'administration et l'économie à tous les niveaux dans le pays. Les écoles de cadres du « 7 mai », dont la tâche est de perfectionner dans le sens révolutionnaire des centaines de milliers de cadres du Parti et du gouvernement sont conçues sur le modèle militaire. Le président d'un comité révolutionnaire d'une de ces écoles que j'ai visitée était, lui aussi, un cadre vétéran de l'armée ; les étudiants étaient organisés en compagnies comme dans l'armée.

« Nous vivons et nous travaillons, m'a dit le président Wang, selon l'idéologie révolutionnaire. Nous nous attaquons au travail physique comme si nous étions engagés dans une bataille. Nous avons pris comme modèle l'ancien collège militaro-politique antijaponais. » (Cette institution avait été organisée à Yen-an, en 1937, par Mao Tsé-toung pour former

les cadres militaires révolutionnaires).

Lors des diverses réceptions officielles, données par Chou En-lai, pendant mon séjour à Pékin, le Premier ministre était toujours entouré, à la table d'honneur, par des chefs des diverses sections des forces armées, tous membres du tout-puissant bureau politique du Parti communiste chinois, et qu'en d'autres pays on aurait appelés des « gros galons ». Mais ce terme est sans signification en Chine, puisque même les plus hauts cadres militaires ne portent aucun insigne de grade.

Enfin, le successeur désigné de Mao Tsé-toung est le maréchal Lin Piao (bien que cette dignité n'existe plus en Chine), ministre de la Défense nationale et l'un des fondateurs de l'armée Rouge.

Cependant, ayant constaté l'importance écrasante du rôle de l'armée dans toutes les sphères de l'activité du pays, on se tromperait profondément en en déduisant que la Chine est devenue un pays militariste. Et cela en raison même de la nature de l'A.L.P. telle que l'ont conçue Mao Tsé-toung et Lin Piao, et du fait du rôle particulier qu'ils ont assigné, dès le début, à l'ancienne armée Rouge par rapport à la révolution et à la société chinoises. Il est d'ailleurs significatif qu'un des premiers actes du président Mao et de ses camarades, après qu'ils eurent gagné la révolution culturelle, fut de fonder les écoles de cadres du « 7 mai » en reprenant le modèle de l'ancien collège révolutionnaire de Yen-an.

A l'entrée de l'école des cadres du « 7 mai », que j'ai visitée, on peut voir une reproduction de quelques idéogrammes écrits, à l'époque, pour le collège de Yen-an : « D'un côté nous étudions ; de l'autre nous participons au travail productif. » Et dès les premiers jours de la naissance de l'armée Rouge, l'accent fut mis sur les relations étroites qui devaient exister entre l'armée et le peuple, notamment par l'aide apportée à ce dernier dans la production.

Pas même une aiguille

Par la suite, dès 1938, Mao avait établi trois règles de discipline pour l'armée Rouge des ouvriers et des paysans :

1. Obéir aux ordres dans toutes les actions ;
2. Ne rien prendre aux travailleurs et aux paysans ;
3. Restituer toute chose empruntée aux gens du pays.

« Nos troupes doivent observer les principes corrects qui régissent les relations entre l'armée et le peuple, entre l'armée et le gouvernement, entre l'armée et le Parti, entre officiers et soldats, entre travail militaire et travail politique... », déclarait Mao Tsé-toung dans un discours, très cité depuis (« Organisez-vous », novembre 1943).

« Les officiers doivent veiller sur leurs hommes et ne pas être indifférents au

HOUSTON CHRONICLE

Friday, July 2, 1971

Review our arms policies

A world arms race is under way and the United States is playing an increasing role in it. The scramble does not involve the super weapons but the traditional hardware of death and the means to transport troops quickly.

The smaller and developing nations of the world are buying increasing amounts of arms from the United States, European countries, and the Soviet bloc.

The arms spree is regularly deplored by different international agencies which argue that the smaller nations need to make economic advances and that money which should be used for humanitarian purposes is being soaked up by arms purchases.

The United States alone reportedly is selling, financing, approving and giving away more than \$6.7 billion in arms around the world this year, an increase of 25 percent over last year.

In one area, South America, President Richard Nixon has asked Congress to double the dollar value of arms sales, jumping from \$75 million to \$150 million.

At the time this was announced Chilean President Salvador Allende Gossens, first freely elected Marxist chief of state in the Western hemisphere decried the escalation. Any action contributing to an arms race is a negative factor, he said.

Latin American countries "by their common origin and tragedy of under-development should seek other ways

that the U.S. bargains should not be passed up.

The administration's argument for increased arms sales to South America is that the countries there are going to purchase arms elsewhere if the United States will not sell to them. It is pointed out that the \$75 million limitation was set by Congress in 1967 with the hope that Latin nations would spend less on arms and more on items like health and education.

Instead, countries like Britain, France, West Germany, Italy, and Spain started pushing their arms. In the last five years those nations have sold nearly a billion dollars worth of military hardware in South America.

Another argument for around-the-world sales by the United States is that the Nixon doctrine calls for replacing American troops abroad with stronger local military forces. Thus, arms sales must increase. The administration also wants to make the sales to ease our balance of payments deficit.

Such pragmatic arguments lose much of their strength when a Pakistan-like tragedy arises. With the aid of military hardware from the United States, the Pakistani government has crushed a separatist movement in East Pakistan. The result has been a tragedy of huge proportions: Some 200,000 East Pakistanis killed and six million made refugees.

Even though this slaughter has not ended, the administration has told Congress that it is likely that additional

than confrontation to resolve their differences," he said.

But this week it was disclosed that Chile had been granted \$5 million in credits by the United States for purchases of military equipment. The strongmen in the Chilean military have apparently become convinced

Congress that it is likely that additional military equipment will be shipped to Pakistan."

The bureaucratic justification: Permits already issued authorizing shipments would not be revoked. It is disgusting that our government should in any way support and abet the slaughter of East Pakistanis.

¿Hacia un Deshielo Internacional?

RAMAS

EDITORIAL

12/8/71

P. INT.

12 agosto 71

De unos meses a esta parte determinados hechos internacionales, bastante concretos por cierto, concurren a indicar que estamos en los umbrales de una nueva época en las relaciones mundiales. La novela de Ilya Ehrenburg que prestó su nombre a la apertura soviética después de la muerte de Stalin, puede servir, otra vez, para englobar gráficamente los fenómenos de la política internacional que estamos presenciando, incomprensibles para las gentes traumatizadas por los largos años de la "guerra fría"; enojosos para quienes se habituaron a calcular beneficios atroces de la tirantez internacional; vigorosamente alentadores para los convencidos de que sobre una paz bien cimentada en el respeto a la vocación política de cada nación, es dado erigir un eficaz sistema de cooperación entre los pueblos del planeta para común y solidario beneficio de la humanidad.

La dureza que instrumentaron desde agosto de 1945 —al término de la Segunda Guerra Mundial— los dirigentes de los dos bloques políticos e ideológicos que a partir de esa fecha comenzaron, peligrosamente, a disputarse la hegemonía universal, llegó a su punto culminante con John Foster Dulles al frente del Departamento de Estado norteamericano y Vlacheslav M. Molotov como ministro soviético de Relaciones Exteriores. El mundo aparecía, entonces, brutal e irremisiblemente dividido, hasta el punto de no considerarse pesimismo excesivo cualquier presagio sobre un enfrentamiento inevitable, montado en delirios llamados a ser los últimos por la equilibrada capacidad de destrucción nuclear de los presuntos beligerantes.

México, en el ámbito continental, logró superar aquellas conocidas y feroces tensiones en el caso de Cuba, de un extremo; del otro extremo, acrecentó sus relaciones con aquellos países hermanos de regímenes de signo opuesto. Nuestra posición externa ha sido invariable en lo primordial, concientes como somos de que la amistad entre los pueblos es lo permanente y positivo, y que los gobiernos son, por naturaleza y definición, históricamente transitorios. Nos han servido de brújula constante la No Intervención y el respeto a la autodeterminación de los pueblos; de aquí que México, en el hemisferio, haya sido visto como el propiciador de una armonía distorsionada en los últimos años por el choque, abierto o subterráneo, de intereses desconocedores de la sensibilidad y el pensamiento de los pueblos latinoamericanos.

Se entiende ahora que los pueblos del continente, y especialmente los latinoamericanos, deben mantener y estrechar sus vínculos por encima de las preferencias doctrinarias de sus respectivos gobiernos. Son demasiado hondos y complejos los problemas para entretenernos en el cultivo de reproches por diferencias imposibles de remediar, o por desviaciones gubernamentales que corresponde subsanar a cada pueblo. México desea cooperar con los países centroamericanos en la satisfacción de urgencias comunes, en plan de absoluta igualdad; intercambiar experiencias, comprometerse en el desarrollo de proyectos de servicio solidario, sin incurrir en esa forma de intervencionismo, no por su apariencia sutil menos malsana, de retraerse con el pretexto de que determinado gobierno no se acomoda al ideal democrático que propugnamos.

En la Declaración de Salta, firmada por los presidentes de Chile, doctor Salvador Allende, y de Argentina, general Alejandro Lanusse, ha quedado establecido que dos gobiernos de opuesta orientación ideológica pueden colaborar estrechamente para el mejor servicio de sus países. El arreglo previsible entre Chile y Argentina del diferendo, en la Tierra del Fuego, sobre el Canal de Beagle, será uno de los puntos más positivos de los acuerdos a que llegaron, hace pocos días, los gobiernos de Santiago y Buenos Aires.

En la cuenca del Plata los países ribereños de aquel río austral, se han propuesto planes coordinados de desarrollo conjunto que les van a redituvar abundantes beneficios a largo plazo. Las inmensidades de la Amazonia han atraído las miradas de los jefes de Estado de Brasil y Colombia, quienes acaban de reunirse en uno de los puertos de aquel mar interior, prácticamente olvidado desde los tiempos en que Francisco de Orellana lo recorrió en toda su extensión de 5 mil 340 kilómetros, hace más de cuatro siglos.

Los desafíos que deben afrontar los pueblos latinoamericanos son de magnitud impresionante. Tales retos exigen una nueva mentalidad, un nuevo estilo. Una activa toma de conciencia.

El Panorama
Económico Mundial

de industrias y al progreso de la agricultura, sin reparar en la filiación política de sus socios. También el Mercado Común Centroamericano, meses más tarde, hizo de lado pugnas y rivalidades políticas regionales para proyectar sobre bases técnicas y modernas la producción de los cinco países del Istmo. Idénticos propósitos buscó el Grupo Andino en 1969, sin pretender entorpecer los planes integracionistas a mayor escala, y sin encontrar obstáculo en la contrapuesta orientación ideológica de los gobiernos que ese año firmaron el acuerdo final en Bogotá.

La autarquía económica ya no es lema ni siquiera de los nacionalistas utópicos; la interdependencia comercial de la época que vivimos ha rebasado los altos y egoístas muros de contención erigidos por un mercantilismo maliciosamente disfrazado con doctrinas filosóficas.

Los esfuerzos de los últimos años por dar al comercio internacional, aparte simpatías o diferencias políticas, una urgente equidad, han encontrado en México firme apoyo. Se reconoce que también hemos acertado al buscar que esa nueva dimensión de la solidaridad internacional empiece con los países que, al sur del Suchiate, están más cerca de nosotros cultural, geográfica, afectivamente.

Consecuencias Políticas y Sociales

El expreso reconocimiento, con sus efectos políticos absolutos, del derecho de los pueblos a la autodeterminación de sus destinos, tendrá que clarificar, sin la menor duda, la atmósfera internacional. Está demostrado que no pocos países afligidos por una violencia endémica, son inducidos desde el exterior a recrudecer tales enfrentamientos dramáticos. De afuera se azuzan estallidos neonihilistas con estéril sacrificio de gentes ilusas, ingenuas, o astutamente sectarizadas, cuya desesperación les impide percibir otra vía para lograr el cambio de estructuras sociales caducas; de afuera se otorga generosa asistencia a la represión protectora del statu quo, y que termina a poco andar por volverse indiscriminada en su proclividad original a ensañarse contra organizaciones obreras y campesinas, y contra los intelectuales progresistas.

Uma nova arma dos "Marines"

13/9/71

Edward K. Delong
Especial para o JB

Washington (UPI-JB) — Com muitas novas armas atualmente custando mais do que o previsto e realizando menos, o Corpo de Fuzileiros Navais dos Estados Unidos (Marines) acha que pode se vangloriar um pouco com seu mais recente transporte anfíbio de tropas de assalto.

Autoridades dos Marines dizem que o novo veículo não só custa menos para fabricar e operar do que o modelo de 16 anos que está substituindo, como também custa menos do que o originalmente estimado e excede as especificações necessárias de atuação.

Hidrojato

Embora admitam que seu sucesso se deve em parte à boa sorte, os Marines também acentuam orgulhosamente sua administração do programa de Cr\$ 1,2 bilhão, seu esforço de desenvolvimento e de testes que precedeu ao contrato de produção.

"Pode em parte ter sido uma feliz coincidência", disse o coronel Charles R. Munn, chefe da Divisão de Material Bélico e Transporte Motorizado dos Marines; "mas acho que foi, principalmente, a maneira como o programa foi administrado para conseguir o veículo requerido, eliminando, ao mesmo tempo, o superfluo."

O novo transporte de tropas, chamado LVTP7, parece um grande e volumoso tanque, com uma pequena torre de arma. Seu principal armamento é uma metralhadora de calibre 50 na torre, que está instalada no lado direito do teto, perto da frente.

O tenente-coronel Robert. J. Keller, diretor do programa do LVTP7, disse que

a coisa mais revolucionária a respeito do novo veículo é uma propulsão a hidrojato capaz de movimentá-lo no oceano a 13,5 km/h. O único outro veículo militar que possui esta característica é o tanque soviético PT76, destinado mais a vadear rios e cruzar lagos do que as ondas do mar e a arrebentação.

A propulsão a hidrojato dá ao novo transporte uma vantagem de quase 3,5 quilômetros na água em relação ao LVTP5A, o transporte de tropas anfíbio padrão dos Marines desde 1955.

Características

Estas são, entre outras, as diferenças entre os dois transportes de tropas:

- o preço de Cr\$ 700 mil por veículo para o novo, em comparação a Cr\$ 790 mil para o velho. Uma velocidade máxima de 66 km/h para o novo bem superior a do antigo.

- um raio de ação de 480 Km em terra ou 112 Km na água para o novo, comparado com 304 Km em terra ou 112 Km na água, para o velho.

- um custo de operação e manutenção de Cr\$ 215,00 por hora para o novo, quase a metade do do antigo. O novo transporte também funciona a óleo diesel, muito mais barato que a gasolina usada no antigo.

- o novo transporta apenas 25 soldados, em comparação a 34 transportados no veículo antigo, mas Keller disse que isto também é uma vantagem porque os estudos de engenharia humana demonstraram que cada homem precisava de mais espaço.

"O que queremos é ter as tropas prontas para o combate, quando acabarem de ser transportadas neste veículo", disse ele. "O soldado deve ficar tão con-

fortável quanto o possível, a fim de que não caia de cara no chão quando sair."

Transporte, a sua missão

O Marines Corps estima que o veículo será usado 80% do tempo como o transporte de pessoal blindado em terra e 20% do tempo como veículo transportando tropas para a praia dos navios-transportes.

Suas laterais de alumínio espesso oferecem proteção contra balas de calibre 30 disparadas de até 55 metros. Seu teto tem uma chance de 99% de resistir a uma explosão de obus 105, à altura de 4,5 a 7,5 metros acima dele.

Todas estas características superam as especificações do projeto, disse Keller, assim como sua estabilidade contra oscilações — importante para atravessar a arrebentação — sua capacidade de subir colinas, sua velocidade e raio de ação.

Keller disse que os novos veículos já estão na linha de produção da FMC Corp., em San José, Califórnia, com a entrega do primeiro veículo operacional programada para o dia 26. Daqui a um ano, disse ele, um batalhão deverá estar equipado com o novo veículo e inteiramente treinado em seu uso.

Um total de 15 veículos protótipo já foram construídos, e após mais de 160 mil quilômetros de testes, sob todas as condições, para eliminar defeitos. Com isto, eliminou-se a necessidade de experiências-pilotos, fazendo-se grandes economias.

A FMC tem um contrato para construir 939 veículos. Serão fabricadas também versões de carro-socorro com guindaste, veículo de comando e limpeza, além do transporte básico.

USA: PRESIONA LA CASA BLANCA PARA VENDER ARMAMENTOS A JAPON*

95/9/71

WASHINGTON, 15 SEP (INTER PRESS SERVICE)- EL GOBIERNO DE LOS ESTADOS UNIDOS BUSCA COMPENSAR EL DEFICIT DE SU INTERCAMBIO CON JAPON PRESIONANDO PARA QUE ESTE COMPRE EQUIPO MILITAR NORTEAMERICANO. EL DEFICIT LLEGO A 1.000 MILLONES DE DOLARES EN 1970 Y EL CONJUNTO DEL DESEQUILIBRIO (COMERCIAL Y DE PAGOS) PARA ESTE AÑO SE ESTIMA QUE ALCANZARA A 2.700 MILLONES DE DOLARES A FAVOR DE JAPON.

LOS FUNCIONARIOS DE LA CASA BLANCA SOSTIENEN QUE PARTE DE ESTE DEFICIT SE DEBE A LA ASISTENCIA MILITAR QUE JAPON NO PAGA, SIENDO EN CONSECUENCIA LA UNICA POTENCIA INDUSTRIAL DEL MUNDO QUE NO DEBE SOLVENTAR SU PROPIA DEFENSA. LOS ESTADOS UNIDOS GASTAN ANUALMENTE 650 MILLONES DE DOLARES PARA EL MANTENIMIENTO DE SUS FUERZAS EN EL JAPON. LOS MILITARES Y FUNCIONARIOS JAPONESES HAN AFIRMADO QUE LA MAYOR PARTE DE DICHOS GASTOS, COMO ASI TAMBIEN LAS INSTALACIONES MILITARES NORTEAMERICANAS EN SU TERRITORIO, CUMPLEN OBJETIVOS LIGADOS A LA DEFENSA DE LOS ESTADOS UNIDOS Y NO DEL JAPON. CONSECUENTEMENTE, OPINAN, SON LOS ESTADOS UNIDOS QUIENES SE BENEFICIAN CON EL USO DE MILLARES DE HECTAREAS DE TIERRA JAPONESA, CUYO VALOR DE ALQUILER SE ESTIMA EN 450 MILLONES DE DOLARES ANUALES.

JAPON INVIERTE EN EQUIPO MILITAR EN LOS ESTADOS UNIDOS DE 100 A 120 MILLONES DE DOLARES ANUALES, PERO EN GENERAL PREFERE PAGAR LICENCIAS DE PRODUCCION A LAS EMPRESAS NORTEAMERICANAS Y FRABRICAR POR SI MISMO LOS EQUIPOS. PRODUJO HASTA HOY 204 JETS CAZABOMBARDE-ROS F-140 . PARA EL AÑO 1977 SE HABRAN CONCLUIDO 104 JETS F-4 PHANTOM, DE LOS CUALES EL ORGANISMO JAPONES DE DEFENSA HA RESERVADO 50 O 60. WASHINGTON HA PRESIONADO POR AUMENTAR LAS COMPRAS DIRECTAS DE PRODUCTOS TERMINADOS, VARIANTE QUE FAVORECERIA EL EQUILIBRIO DE LA BALANZA DE PAGOS NORTEAMERICANA, Y RECLAMO AL GOBIERNO DE TOKIO QUE ADQUIERA APARATOS DE ENTRENAMIENTO F-5B.

BAJO UNA PRESION SIMILAR DE LA CASA BLANCA, EL GOBIERNO ALEMAN ADQUIRIO RECIENTEMENTE MAS DE UN CENTENAR DE PHANTOMS, LO CUAL TIENDE A EQUILIBRAR LA BALANZA DE PAGOS ENTRE AMBOS PAISES. POR OTRA PARTE, ESTAS COMPRAS REVITALIZAN LOS NEGOCIOS DE LA MC DONNEL DOUGLAS, FABRICANTE DE LOS CAZABOMBARDEROS REFERIDOS, CUYOS NEGOCIOS SE REDUJERON UN 29 POR CIENTO EN 1970 CON RELACION A 1969 Y

SUS BENEFICIOS NETOS EN UN 33 POR CIENTO. LA PRODUCCION JAPONESA DE PHANTOMS HACIA 1977 NO HACE SINO COMPLICAR EL PANORAMA ANTE LA POSIBILIDAD DE UNA COMPETENCIA COMERCIAL TAMBIEN EN ESTE TERRENO.

LA SEMANA PASADA, EL PRESIDENTE NIXON ENVIO AL CONGRESO LAS CI-
NCO NORTEAMERICANOS EN EQUIPOS DE DEFENSA ENVIADOS

FRAS DE LOS GASTOS NORTEAMERICANOS EN EQUIPOS DE DEFENSA ENTREGADOS
AL EXTRANJERO. SENALO NIXON QUE EL PAPEL QUE SU NACION CUMPLE DES-
DE LA SEGUNDA GUERRA MUNDIAL, DE SOSTENER POR SU CUENTA LOS GASTOS
MILITARES DE OCCIDENTE, DEBE SER ACTUALMENTE COMPARTIDO (AL MENOS
EN FINANCIERAMENTE) POR LAS OTRAS NACIONES INDUSTRIALES. "HA PA-
SADO EL TIEMPO EN QUE LOS ESTADOS UNIDOS COMPETIA (COMERCIALMENTE)
CON UNA MANO EN LA ESPALDA", SENALO.

ENJUGAR EL DEFICIT VENDIENDO ARMAS

WASHINGTON, 16. — El gobierno de los Estados Unidos busca compensar el déficit de su intercambio con el Japón presionando para que éste compre equipo militar norteamericano. El déficit llegó a 1.000 millones de dólares en 1970 y el conjunto del desequilibrio (comercial y de pagos) para este año se estima que alcanzará a 2.700 millones de dólares a favor del Japón.

Los funcionarios de la Casa Blanca sostienen que parte de este déficit se debe a la asistencia militar que el Japón no paga, siendo en consecuencia la única potencia industrial del mundo que no debe solventar su propia defensa. Los Estados Unidos gastan anualmente 650 millones de dólares para

el mantenimiento de sus fuerzas en el Japón. Los militares y funcionarios japoneses han afirmado que la mayor parte de dichos gastos, como así también las instalaciones militares norteamericanas en su territorio, cumplen objetivos ligados a la defensa de los Estados Unidos y no del Japón. Consecuentemente, opinan, son los Estados Unidos quienes se benefician con el uso de millares de hectáreas de tierra japonesa, cuyo valor de alquiler se estima en 450 millones de dólares anuales.

Japón invierte en equipo militar en los Estados Unidos de 100 a 120 millones de dólares anuales, pero en general prefiere pagar licencias de producción a las empresas norteamericanas y

17/9/71
fabricar por sí mismo los equipos. Produjo hasta hoy 204 jets cazabombarderos F-140. Para el año 1977 se habrán concluido 104 Jets F-4 Phantom, de los cuales el organismo japonés de defensa ha reservado 50 ó 60. Washington ha presionado por aumentar las compras directas de productos terminados, variante que favorecería el equilibrio de la balanza de pagos norteamericana, y reclamó al gobierno de Tokio que adquiriera aparatos de entrenamiento F-5B.

Bajo una presión similar de la Casa Blanca, el gobierno alemán adquirió recientemente más de un centenar de Phantom, lo cual tiende a equilibrar la balanza de pagos entre ambos países. Por otra parte, estas compras revitalizan los ne-

gocios de la Mc Donnell Douglas, fabricante de los cazabombarderos referidos, cuyos negocios se redujeron un 25 por ciento en 1970 con relación a 1969 y sus beneficios netos en un 33 por ciento. La producción japonesa de Phantom hacia 1977 no hace sino complicar el panorama ante la posibilidad de una competencia comercial también en este terreno.

La semana pasada, el Presidente Nixon envió al Congreso las cifras de los gastos norteamericanos en equipos de defensa enviados al extranjero. Señaló Nixon que el papel que su nación cumple desde la Segunda Guerra Mundial, de sostener por su cuenta los gastos militares de Occidente, debe ser actualmente compartido (al menos financieramente) por las otras naciones industriales. "Ha pasado el tiempo en que los Estados Unidos competía (comercialmente) con una mano en la espalda", señaló. (IPS).

, 20/9/71 ☐ 1.º Caderno

Laird quer mais verbas militares

Warrenton (Reuters/Latin-JB) — O Secretário de Defesa, Melvin Laird, ao afirmar ontem que os Estados Unidos correm o risco de se transformarem em potência de segunda categoria pois o desenvolvi-

mento militar soviético
avançou mais rapidamente
do que se esperava este
ano, pediu o aumento de
verbas para a defesa.

Laird expressou que o Go-
vêrno deve dedicar-se a um
esfôrço decisivo para au-
mentar as verbas militares
do próximo ano, a fim de
que seja possível contra-a-
tacar a ameaça soviética.

Falando a jornalistas, o
Secretário de Defesa insis-
tiu em que este não é o
momento para a redução
dos gastos militares, medi-
da solicitada por vários
congressistas e setores da
opinião em pública

opiniao em publica.

Acrescentou que, embora muitas pessoas tenham acusado de assustar o povo com projetos de crescente poderio militar, foi excessivamente conservador em suas apreciações. Observou então que os equipamentos soviéticos avançaram com "tremendo ímpeto nos últimos 10 meses."

Finalmente, disse que certamente os Estados Unidos continuarão sendo economicamente a primeira potência mundial, mas, assinalou, "ficaria satisfeito em poder dizer o mesmo no setor militar."



McDonnell Douglas Is Sued by Northrop Over F18A Accord

30/10/74 h. 7

By a WALL STREET JOURNAL Staff Reporter

LOS ANGELES—Northrop Corp. accused McDonnell Douglas Corp., its partner in building the F18A Hornet strike fighter aircraft, of offering some of Northrop's manufacturing work on the plane to Canadian companies in an attempt to win a big Canadian F18 order.

Northrop said it sued in federal court here charging that McDonnell Douglas had proposed that Canadian concerns perform "substantial portions of the work" that Northrop was entitled to perform under the 1974 agreement between St. Louis-based McDonnell Douglas and Northrop. McDonnell Douglas was named prime contractor on the F18A, a fighter with aircraft carrier capability, but Northrop was designated to perform 40% of the manufacturing work, including

production of the center and aft fuselage sections, the twin vertical tails and associated subsystems.

The unusual legal action between the two F18A contractors clouds the chances of the F18A in its hotly contested competition with General Dynamics Corp.'s F16 for the Canadian order of about 130 planes, valued as high as \$2.34 billion. The Canadian government, which declined immediate comment on the suit, plans to sign a contract for one of the two fighters before the end of December.

"Specific Work" Offer Cited

According to the Northrop complaint, McDonnell Douglas offered the Canadians "specific work in connection with the center and aft fuselage" on the planes the Canadians would order and on half of all the planes that would be built for all other customers, including the aircraft being built for the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps.

In St. Louis, McDonnell Douglas said that although its attorney's haven't examined the complaint, the company "doesn't believe that Northrop is justified and will defend itself vigorously."

Moreover, the company maintained the

suit "won't have any effect," on McDonnell Douglas's proposal to the Canadian government.

Northrop said it previously agreed to allocate certain production work on the Canadian aircraft to Canadian companies. But Northrop said it "consistently told McDonnell Douglas that its offer to give Canadian concerns work on half of all F18A's "was made without Northrop's authorization or consent," in breach of the agreements between the two companies, and requested that the St. Louis company "advise the Canadian government of Northrop's objections."

Northrop said in its complaint that, to its knowledge, McDonnell Douglas so far has refused to pass the objections on to the Canadian government.

Northrop said the dispute with McDonnell Douglas "won't" affect Northrop's commitment to the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps production program. Work is proceeding as planned."

Derivative Aircraft

The F18A is a derivative of another Northrop fighter, and is a tactical aircraft capable of operating from aircraft carriers.

Under their 1974 joint venture agreement, McDonnell Douglas was designated prime contractor for carrier-suitable aircraft for use by the U.S. Navy and foreign countries; Northrop was designated prime contractor for all other versions.

In its comments on the suit, McDonnell Douglas noted that it "involves allocation of specific work between Northrop and McDonnell Douglas" and doesn't involve the amount of McDonnell Douglas's commitment to the Canadian government."

McDonnell Douglas has said that a contract for its F18A Hornet "would mean opportunities for \$3.1 billion" in a broad range of business for Canadian industry, 24,000 jobs for Canadians and participation in production of an estimated 2,500 Hornets into the 1990s.

El 6,5 por Ciento del Producto Bruto Mundial se Destina a Gastos Militares

4/11/77

NUEVA YORK (AFP) — Los gastos militares en el mundo se elevan actualmente a 200 mil millones de dólares por año, reveló un informe publicado por la UN aquí. Dicha suma representa entre el 6 y el 6,5 por ciento del producto nacional bruto del planeta, explicó el documento. El informe, como lo revela su título, se concentró en “las consecuencias económicas y sociales de la carrera armamentista y los gastos militares”. La suma que los países dedican a la defensa equivale a cerca de dos veces y medio el crédito gubernamental mundial para la salud pública. Equivale a 30 veces más del total de ayuda económica prestada por los países industrializados a los países en vías de desarrollo, agregó el informe. En una introducción al informe, el secretario general de la UN, U Thant, dijo que los depósitos de armas acumulados por los países eran suficientes para destruir a la raza humana. Según el documento, las cuatro quintas partes de los gastos militares corresponden a Estados Unidos, la URSS, China Popular, Francia, Gran Bretaña y Alemania Federal.

WASHINGTON POST *Wednesday, Nov. 24, 1971*

Big Four Nations Sell 90% of World's Arms

From News Dispatches

STOCKHOLM, Nov. 23—The United States, the Soviet Union, Britain and France have supplied more than 90 per cent of the major arms to the Third World countries "where all wars have been fought in the past 25 years," according to an exhaustive study published here today.

The value of arms deliveries to the Third World countries over the past 20 years grew almost twice as fast as the gross national product of their developing economies, the study said.

The 900-page document, produced by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, is the most comprehensive study of its kind. It was prepared over the past four years by a team of five researchers.

Largest Supplier

"The United States is the largest supplier of military equipment in the world, accounting for nearly half the world's total trade in weapons," the study said. "Since 1950 well over a third of the total major weapons acquired by Third World countries has

Mig-19s and about 800 Mig-21s," the study said.


Britain, France

Britain and France accounted for more than 20 per cent of the arms deliveries, in 1969, \$200 million worth from Britain and \$100 million worth from France. China's total amounted to 2.2 per cent.

More than 70 per cent of U.S. exports had gone to countries bordering on the Soviet Union and China. Russia supplies 29 developing nations with arms.

The two superpowers mostly supplied weapons free of charge or at subsidized prices and low interest rates, the study said. While Britain's role dwindled in the 1960s, the French share rose as Paris took advantage of "opportunities created by reluctance on the part of other supplying countries." It cited South Africa, after the British embargo in 1964, and Pakistan, after the U.S. embargo of 1965, as examples of nations which turned to France for arms.

The study said that 70 per



Países pobres gastam muito em armamento

24/11/71

Estocolmo (AP-UPI-Reuters/Latin-JB) — O Instituto Internacional de Pesquisas para a Paz (Sipri) revelou ontem que os gastos dos países pobres com armamentos aumentaram sete vezes em 20 anos, atingindo US\$ 1 500 milhões (Cr\$ 8 400 milhões) em 1970, sendo que os Estados Unidos forneceram quase a metade do total.

A compra de armas modernas pelos 91 países do Terceiro Mundo aumenta ao ritmo de 9% ao ano, o que representa o dobro do índice de crescimento do Produto Nacional Bruto dessas nações, segundo o estudo de mil páginas do Sipri sobre O Comércio de Armas com o Terceiro Mundo.

COMPETIÇÃO

"Os Estados Unidos constituem o principal abastecedor de equipamentos militares no mundo, e abrange quase a metade do comércio mundial em armas. Desde 1950, mais de um terço do total de armamentos adquiridos pelos países do Terceiro Mundo provêm diretamente dos EUA", afirma o Sipri.

Mais de 90% das exportações de armas são feitas pelos Estados Unidos, União Soviética, Grã-Bretanha e França. O Instituto diz que todas as guerras dos últimos 25 anos foram travadas por países pobres, mas com armas fornecidas pelas grandes potências.

"No curso dos últimos 20 anos, as exportações de armas pesadas às nações do Terceiro Mundo aumentaram dramaticamente, mas talvez mais

alarmante que o imenso aumento no valor deste comércio de armas é a crescente modernização das fornecidas aos países em desenvolvimento. Os povos do Terceiro Mundo — acentua o Sipri — compram cada vez mais aviões supersônicos e foguetes antiaéreos, alguns dos quais projetados para ogivas nucleares."

Os Estados Unidos e a União Soviética tiveram a seu cargo, em conjunto, dois terços do total das exportações, enquanto os franceses e ingleses são responsáveis por 20%.

O estudo — elaborado em quatro anos — diz que os Estados Unidos dominaram completamente o comércio de armas na década de 50, mas os soviéticos agora seguem seus passos de perto.

A União Soviética só começou a fornecer armas fora do bloco socialista depois da primeira metade da década de 50. Os primeiros países a recebê-las foram os do Oriente Médio.

Desde então, os soviéticos venderam armas a 29 países em desenvolvimento e, em meados da década de 60, já abasteciam mais Governos que os Estados Unidos. Entre 70 a 80% das exportações norte-americanas foram destinadas às nações que circundam a URSS e a China.


A influência norte-americana junto aos regimes conservadores da América Latina, segundo o documento, "diminuiu devido às restrições à ajuda militar impostas pelo Congresso norte-americano e por suas crescentes aquisições de armas na Europa."

INTERNATIONAL

29/11/79



Wally McNamee—Newsweek



Tass—Sovfoto



Israel Sun

The Badgers are coming: After Rogers noted Russian 'restraint,' Sisco called for a firm response

The Mideast: The Phantom 'No'

Since last summer, when the U.S. suspended the shipment of Phantom jets to Israel, officials in Jerusalem have been engaged in an intensive campaign to get Washington to change its mind. As part of that campaign, Israel has sought to "politicize" the Phantom issue in the U.S. by mobilizing the support of the American Jewish community. So far the White House has stood firm under the mounting pressure and recently, in a clear effort to relieve that pressure, Secretary of State William Rogers implied in a magazine interview that further Phantom deliveries were not necessary at this time because the Soviet Union had shown "restraint" in its military aid to Egypt. But Rogers's attempt to cool the situation backfired. Last week, only a few days after his remarks were published, the State Department was forced to do an about-face and admit that the Russians had not been so restrained after all.

What made the State Department reverse course were intelligence reports that Russian pilots had recently ferried "six to eight" TU-16 Badger bombers to bases in Egypt. Unlike the twenty TU-16s already on reconnaissance duty in Egypt, these new Soviet planes were apparently fitted out with batteries of air-to-ground missiles that posed a potential offensive threat both to Israeli ground installations and the U.S. Sixth Fleet. At the very least, State Department insiders believed, the introduction of this new Soviet weapon into the Mideast balance required Washington to take a fresh look at its Phantom policy—a re-evaluation that could well herald a dangerous re-escalation of the Mideast arms race.

Curiously, Rogers himself knew about the Soviet air-to-ground missiles before he authorized the publication of his optimistic interview with U.S. News and

World Report. But apparently over the reservations of some of his closest advisers, the Secretary of State chose to let the interview stand—with only a cautionary reference noting that a "review" of the arms situation was under way. By early last week, however, the accumulated weight of the intelligence reports plus cryptic leaks to the press brought the matter to a head. Somewhat defensively, a State Department spokesman told reporters that his boss's rosy assessment was based only on the period through Nov. 1. But according to sources inside the department, that was not good enough for Assistant Secretary Joseph Sisco, the man charged with carrying out U.S. policy in the Middle East. He insisted on a disclosure of the missile shipments and a firm public U.S. response.

'Dressing Down': In arguing his case, Sisco may have recalled that Rogers's delayed response to Soviet violations of the Mideast cease-fire last year perhaps encouraged the Russians to move their missiles to the Suez Canal and certainly helped to precipitate Israel's withdrawal from U.N. mediator Gunnar Jarring's peace talks. "During that period last year," said one official, "Rogers studied the pictures taken by American planes and refused to believe our photo-reading specialists. Sisco was mad over Rogers's foot-dragging then—and he didn't want to see it repeated." And this time, the Assistant Secretary won his point. For last week Rogers called in Soviet Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin for what one aide called a "restrained dressing down."

To complicate matters further, no one within the Administration seriously believed that the Soviet planes or the missiles that they carried had tipped the arms balance in the Middle East. Roughly akin to the obsolete U.S. B-47 bomb-

er, the twin-engine TU-16 is considered no match for modern American interceptors and defensive missiles. As a result, few defense specialists thought that the lumbering Soviet jets could get close enough to the U.S. Mediterranean fleet to do any real damage. "Hell, you can shoot these things down with a bow and arrow," said one U.S. expert. "Militarily, they mean zilch—but politically they may mean something else."

Just what the planes did mean was precisely what the State Department was trying to find out. Some of the department's experts on Mideast affairs argued that the modest Soviet shipments simply represented an attempt by Moscow to give Egypt's President Anwar Sadat a domestic political boost. But others pointed out that if the Badger deliveries foreshadowed a major Soviet offensive buildup, Washington would presumably have no choice but to react in kind. "If this is a one-shot agreement," commented one official, "then well and good. But if it snowballs, our attitude would have to be different." Unable to reconcile these conflicting theories, the Administration opted for a wait-and-see policy.

Blood: As might be expected, the Israelis were not altogether happy with U.S. efforts to play it cool. To them, Rogers's initial willingness to let his praise for Soviet restraint stand in the face of the TU-16 shipments was clear evidence of U.S. self-delusion. The Secretary, the Israelis contended, was handing out verbal placebos designed to tranquilize those who oppose Washington's no-Phantom policy. And although few Israelis were prepared to say that their country was in an inferior military position, many were distressed by what they saw as an erosion of their superiority. "What this means," said one Israeli defense official,

"is that if war breaks out, we will win again, but we will bleed more ... and that blood is on Washington's head."

Statements such as that seemed certain to whip up further pressure on the White House to proceed with the Phantom deal. Indeed, with Israel's Prime Minister Golda Meir almost certain to visit the U.S. in the next few weeks for a long-sought chat with the President, the most significant impact of the Soviet move may well be on U.S. politics. Last week, the Administration got a taste of things to come, as Congresswoman Bella Abzug of New York and seven representatives of American Jewish organizations descended on Sisco to lobby for the jets. At the same time, 100 of the nation's most influential Jewish leaders announced plans to convene in Washington next week to push for a resumption of weapons' sales to Jerusalem. In talks with top Republicans, the Jewish leaders are expected to underscore the importance of Jewish support for Mr. Nixon's re-election bid next year. And in meetings with Democratic Presidential candidates, the group will no doubt try to promote the Phantoms as a winning campaign issue.

At the moment, there is no way of telling just how effective this lobbying effort will be—or how future Russian moves will influence the Phantom decision. But given the impressive political clout wielded by Israel's friends in the U.S., there seems to be a real question about how long the Administration can continue to play its waiting game.

Unto the Third Generation

Though more than a quarter century has passed since the Nazis pursued their "final solution to the Jewish problem," the whole idea of promoting a "German Culture Festival" in a Jewish state struck many Israelis as distinctly premature. But few had expected that the appearance of West German performers in Israel over the last two weeks would bring out shouting, egg-pitching demonstrators to disrupt concerts and theatrical performances. In the event, however, even a lecture by German author Günter Grass was not spared—despite the fact that Grass, through such novels as "The Tin Drum," had done as much as anyone to waken the conscience of his own countrymen to the horrors of the Nazi era.

Significantly, most of the demonstrators who plagued Grass were not the older Israelis who still carry searing personal memories of the Nazi terror. Instead, the disruptions were mostly the work of right-wing Israeli youths and the American-spawned Jewish Defense League. Noting this fact, Grass rebuked such extremist groups in Israel for exploiting a historic tragedy for their own political ends. "I think it's very bad to use the victims of the crimes of Nazism for this," he said. "And I don't like the Bible mentality that says the second and third generations must carry on the burden for the early generation."

The Crime Issue


A normal Jewish nation will have arrived the day that the first Jewish horse-thief is arrested in Tel Aviv.

So wrote the late Zionist poet Chaim Nachman Bialik more than 40 years ago. And though few horsethieves roam the streets of Israel these days, Bialik would probably be among the first to agree that the Promised Land is painfully normal today. In the Holy City of Jerusalem, prostitutes ply their trade just minutes away from the Old City, and in the sprawling market of Tel Aviv, gangs of beefy goons extort protection money from the peddlers of kibbutz produce. Even more disturbing, many journalists, scholars and politicians have of late become convinced that Israeli mobsters have begun to organize the nation's underworld—and that some high-placed government officials in Jerusalem have conveniently chosen to ignore this fact.

In other societies, exposés of crime and corruption are often received with indifference. But for many Israelis, who think of their nation as embodying special moral virtue, the recent spate of scandals has sparked something of a crisis of confidence. Perhaps nothing has shaken their self-assurance more than news of a multi-million-dollar scandal involving the operation of the Abu Rudeis oil fields seized by the Israelis when they occupied the Sinai Peninsula in 1967.

In a memo to the Deputy Minister of Finance, a government geologist charged that the man in charge of the Sinai oil fields—a burly seventh-generation sabra named Mordechai Friedman—had stolen more than \$500,000 worth of equipment from Abu Rudeis and had received immense under-the-table payoffs from foreign firms interested in exploring the region. Subsequent newspaper investigations accused Friedman of running the fields as a feudal fief, flying in dozens of Israeli big shots for drunken orgies and "hiring" the sons of influential men to soak up sun—all at government expense.

Pressure: What worried many Israelis more than the scandal itself, however, was what looked suspiciously like official efforts to cover it up. The geologist's original charges against Friedman came to light only after a leak to the press. And then Justice Minister Yaakov Shimshon Shapir, who received the complaint from the Finance Ministry, hemmed and hawed for nearly six months before taking action. Under public pressure, Shapir finally appointed former Attorney General Moshe Ben-Zeev to investigate the affair—and then promptly announced that Friedman had been cleared of all charges. Denying that this was so, Ben-Zeev revealed that he had recommended a police investigation. Later, Justice Minister Shapir's precarious position was compromised even further by reports that his old law firm had been counsel to Friedman's private oil firm. And last week, the Israeli Cabinet or-



Israel Sun

dered a rare commission of inquiry to sort out the Abu Rudeis charges.

To many Israelis, the Sinai affair simply cast further doubt on an already suspect officialdom. In recent months, for example, the press has been sprinkled with hints of official foot-dragging in the so-called "Lansky affair." The flap centers on underworld financial wizard Meyer Lansky—who fled Miami for Israel more than a year ago. Still under indictment by a U.S. grand jury for conspiring to conceal unreported income, Russian-born Meyer Lansky, 71, has won extension of his tourist visa six times and has filed for Israeli citizenship under the Law of Return—which grants immigration privileges to Jews throughout the world. Two months ago, however, Lansky's plans appeared to hit a snag when the Ministry of Interior rejected Lansky's latest request for visa renewal. But last week, a high court spared the crime chieftain once again, this time barring his expulsion pending a decision on his citizenship application.

Self-interest: As some Israeli officials see it, Lansky is a harmless old man whose last criminal conviction was for a Prohibition violation 40 years ago. To many critics in the press, however, the government's stand appeared to be motivated by self-interest. Each year, these newspapers pointed out, Lansky and his underworld associates pour vast sums into Israeli bonds and Israeli philanthropies. As the daily Ha'aretz saw it, the government seemed afraid of losing the millions of dollars in illicit money first "laundered" in mob-controlled financial institutions and then funneled into Israeli business and industry.

Nor were law-enforcement experts convinced that Lansky was harmless. "In my opinion, making Israel into a national parents home for retired criminals ... endangers the public peace," says Dr. Amos Shapira, senior lecturer in law at

Newsweek



Israel Sun

Signs of normalcy: Lansky walks his dog in Tel Aviv, police raid Sinai oil field, Friedman hosting Ben-Gurion after 1967 war

Tel Aviv University. "It is preferable to consider the general welfare above the individual, even if he has in his baggage great financial inducements." Or as the U.S. Justice Department's Dougald McMillan recently said in an interview with an Israeli newsmen: "If Meyer Lansky and his friends are allowed to remain, you will have an import of organized crime . . . They will drag you into prostitution, blackmail, violence and all the troubles that crime brings."

Whores: In fact, it is too late for Lansky and his friends to do that. For many of the troubles to which McMillan referred already plague Israel. Prostitution, in particular, has been growing dramatically. Police estimate that some 1,000 whores now peddle their favors in Tel Aviv and Jerusalem. On the basis of a three-month investigation, however, NEWSWEEK's Michael Elkins reports that underworld sources put the figure at twice that number. And the strongly pro-Israel London Jewish Chronicle has estimated that more than 5,000 prostitutes are active in the nation as a whole.


For the most part, the so-called "road-runners"—girls who plod Israel's highways soliciting drivers—are in business for themselves. But in the major cities, mob influence appears to be on the rise. Operating out of cafés and apartments near Tel Aviv's seashore, high-priced call girls catering to the tourist trade openly admitted to Elkins their "agency" affiliations. And in some areas, the racket is so elaborate that local syndicates employ networks of procurers to round up clients. "If a man wants a girl," one such steerer told Elkins, "I've got the agency number to call. He gets what he wants and I get a commission. Hell, it's so well organized that I don't get paid by the piece; I get a monthly retainer and a sales commission on top of that."

Local mobsters have also muscled in on Israel's national pastime—soccer. Late

in the summer, an enterprising reporter for the weekly Hadashot Hasport (Sports News) blew the lid off the juiciest sports scandal in the nation's history by publishing an interview with two well-known footballers who admitted accepting thousands of dollars to throw a series of eight games. Soon, other players and team officials were falling over each other to confess similar sins. At the same time, an investigation by Supreme Court Justice Moshe Etzioni revealed that the same coterie of gamblers responsible for the fixes had also been rigging the National Sports Toto, or government-approved sports lottery, in their own favor.

Mobsters: Perhaps the most brutal example of Israel's crime problem is found in the market places of Tel Aviv. In the Carmel Shuk—the city's open-air produce market—mobsters hold the reins on a vicious protection racket. Curiously, however, their goon squads have met with precious little interference from police, who respond somewhat lamely to press criticism with claims that the criminals perform "a real service." Things are not much better in the city's nightclub district, where a moonlighting municipal official allegedly controls protection. With the exception of a reprimand for working "on the side," he has been free from legal troubles for some time. And to many observers, that is more than coincidental. "With this man's background," one informant said, "the very fact that he is employed by the city is taken in underworld circles to mean that the protector is protected. So who is going to be foolish enough to testify against him—or to fight him?"

For the time being, in fact, the future for such mobsters looks fairly bright. Despite the apparently overwhelming evidence that crime and corruption have become national problems, the government's response has been to try to sweep the issues under the rug. In an interview



Photoreporters

with Elkins, an assistant commander of the national police, Shmuel Roth, flatly claimed: "There is nothing like organized crime—not even the beginnings of it—in Israel." And in a recent report, Attorney General Meir Shamgar came to the same comforting conclusion.

But even before the lengthy report was issued, underworld sources confidently predicted that it would be a whitewash. And since then, many Israelis have called Shamgar's methods into question—especially his near-total reliance on what many consider the highly suspect police accounts and estimates. Nonetheless, even the most concerned Israelis still believe that their budding crime wave remains within manageable proportions. What distresses them is that public officials have so far avoided coming to grips with the issue—and if that continues, Israel's crime problem could become big-time, indeed.

November 29, 1971

«LAS 4 GRANDES POTENCIAS, Y SOBRE TODO ESTADOS UNIDOS, ABSORBEN CASI TODO EL COMERCIO MUNDIAL DE ARMAS»

15/02/71

WASHINGTON, 15 DIC (INTER PRESS SERVICE)- ESTADOS UNIDOS ES EL MAYOR PROVEEDOR MUNDIAL DE EQUIPOS MILITARES, Y PARTICIPA DE CASI LA MITAD DEL COMERCIO GLOBAL DE ARMAS. ADEMÁS, JUNTO CON RUSIA, FRANCIA Y GRAN BRETAÑA, MONOPOLIZA EL 90 POR CIENTO DEL TRAFICO DE ARMAS PESADAS -AVIONES, BARCOS, VEHICULOS BLINDADOS Y MISILES- HACIA EL TERCER MUNDO, "QUE ES EL ESCENARIO DONDE SE HAN LIBRADO TODAS LAS GUERRAS EN LOS PASADOS 25 AÑOS", SEGUN EL INSTITUTO DE INVESTIGACIONES SOBRE LA PAZ INTERNACIONAL, DE ESTOCOLMO.

LLEVO 5 AÑOS AL INSTITUTO -UNA FUNDACION INDEPENDIENTE CREADA EN 1966 POR EL GOBIERNO SUECO- COMPILAR ESTADISTICAS SOBRE PROVISION DE ARMAS ESTRATEGICAS AL TERCER MUNDO. EL ESTUDIO RESULTANTE, QUE AL CONTRARIO DE LOS ANTERIORES PONE DE RELIEVE LAS CIFRAS CONTRA EL FONDO POLITICO Y ECONOMICO, HA SIDO RECIBIDO POR LOS CONOCEDORES DEL TEMA COMO EL MAS EXHAUSTIVO DE SU CLASE.

"DESDE 1950 UNA TERCERA PARTE, COMO MINIMO, DEL TOTAL DE ARMAS PESADAS ADQUIRIDAS POR EL TERCER MUNDO, HA PROVENIDO DIRECTAMENTE DE ESTADOS UNIDOS". DE 1950 A 1970, LAS EXPORTACIONES DE ESTAS ARMAS AL TERCER MUNDO AUMENTARON 7 VECES, Y EN 1970 TOTALIZABAN 1,5 MIL MILLONES DE DOLARES ANUALES. "ESTE INCREMENTO ANUAL, DEL ORDEN DEL 9 POR CIENTO, DUPLICA VIRTUALMENTE EL DEL PRODUCTO BRUTO NACIONAL DE LOS PAISES DEL TERCER MUNDO".

SEÑALA EL INFORME QUE LAS GRANDES POTENCIAS POR UN LADO CUIDAN DE NO ENFRENTARSE ENTRE SI, Y POR OTRO, CON SUS MASIVOS SUMINISTROS DE ARMAS A LOS PAISES EN DESARROLLO, AVIVAN LOS CONFLICTOS LOCALES, CON EL PELIGRO DE PROVOCAR EL HOLOCAUSTO NUCLEAR DE TODO EL MUNDO".

LAS DOS GRANDES SUPER POTENCIAS CASI SIEMPRE ENTREGAN ARMAS LIBRES DE CARGO, O A PRECIOS POLITICOS Y BAJO INTERESES. LAS EXPORTACIONES NORTEAMERICANAS FUERON, EN UN 70 A 80 POR CIENTO, A PAISES LIMITROFES CON RUSIA Y CHINA (LAS DENOMINADAS "AREAS AVANZADAS DE DEFENSA").

HASTA MEDIADOS DE LA DECADA DEL 50, RUSIA HABIA CONFINADO SUS ENTREGAS DE ARMAS A SUS ALIADOS DEL BLOQUE SOCIALISTA, PERO DE ALLI EN ADELANTE INCORPORO EL CERCANO ORIENTE A SU CLIENTELA. LAS ARMAS SOVIETICAS HAN IDO DESDE ENTONCES A 29 PAISES DEL TERCER MUNDO, Y EN LA SEGUNDA MITAD DE LA DECADA DEL 60 LA UNION SOVIETICA SURTIA DE ARMAS A MAS PAISES DEL TERCER MUNDO QUE ESTADOS UNIDOS. "EN LOS ULTIMOS 20 AÑOS ENTREGO RUSIA A DIVERSOS PAISES EN DESARROLLO, SOCIALISTA Y NO ALINEADOS, ALGO MAS DE 200 MIG-15, UNOS 400 MIG-17, CASI 200 MIG-19 Y APROXIMADAMENTE 800 MIG-21".



NR 26 (CONT NR 25)

EL MONOPOLIO BRITANICO DE ARMAS, EN LO QUE FUERON SUS COLONIAS EN ASIA Y EL MEDIO ORIENTE, HA CEDIDO AL AVANCE DE ESTADOS UNIDOS Y RUSIA, MIENTRAS QUE LOS EXITOS DE FRANCIA COMO PROVEEDOR DE ARMAS DURANTE LOS ANOS 60 SE DEBIERON A QUE SUPO LLENAR EL VACIO DEJADO EN ALGUNOS CASOS POR SUS COMPETIDORES. CITA COMO EJEMPLO EL EMBARGO BRITANICO CONTRA SUDAFRICA EN 1964, Y EL DICTADO POR ESTADOS UNIDOS CONTRA PAKISTAN EN 1965.

LOS PRINCIPALES BENEFICIARIOS DEL TRAFICO DE ARMAS HAN SIDO ASIA Y EL LEVANTE (70 POR CIENTO), EL SUB CONTINENTE INDIO (15 POR CIENTO), Y AFRICA (8 POR CIENTO), AUNQUE LA PARTICIPACION DE ESTE ULTIMO CONTINENTE CRECE SIN CESAR.

OBVIAMENTE EL INCREMENTO MAS NOTABLE CORRESPONDIO A VIETNAM (LA PROVISION DE ARMAS A LOS COMBATIENTES FUE 24 VECES MAS EN LA SEGUNDA MITAD DE LA DECADA DEL 60 QUE EN LA ANTERIOR). PERO EN ANOS RECIENTES SE OBSERVA UN PARALELO AUMENTO DEL TRAFICO HACIA LOS PAISES PETROLEROS DEL GOLFO PERSICO Y HACIA AQUELLOS INVOLUCRADOS EN EL CONFLICTO ARABE-ISRAELI.

EN AMERICA LATINA EL NIVEL ARMAMENTISTA ERA EN 1965/69 APEMAS SUPERIOR AL DE 1950/54, AUNQUE CON TENDENCIA A DESEQUILIBRARSE OTRA VEZ, DEBIDO AL REEQUIPAMIENTO NAVAL Y AEREO DE PAISES SUDAMERICANOS.

DESTACA EL INSTITUTO SUECO QUE EN AFRICA DEL NORTE HAY UNA CARRERA ARMAMENTISTA ENTRE MARRUECOS Y ARGELIA, Y QUE LIBIA ES UN FUERTE COMPRADOR DE ARMAS EN ESA REGION.

EL VOLUMEN CORRESPONDIENTE A SUDAFRICA SUBIO DE UN MILLON DE DOLARES EN 1960 -AÑO EN QUE MUCHOS PAISES DEL CONTINENTE NEGRO LOGRARON SU INDEPENDENCIA- A 41 MILLONES DE DOLARES EN 1969. ESE AÑO IMPORTO SUDAFRICA MAS ARMAS PESADAS QUE TODO EL RESTO DEL CONTINENTE NEGRO, PESE A LA RESOLUCION DEL CONSEJO DE SEGURIDAD DE 1963, IMPONIENDO EN SU CONTRA UN BLOQUEO DE ARMAS.

LOS ENORMES COSTOS DE PRODUCCION IMPIDEN A LOS PAISES EN DESARROLLO ALCANZAR EL AMBICIONADO AUTOABASTECIMIENTO DE ARMAS, PESE A QUE LA MAYORIA DE ELLOS PERSIGUE ESTA META, ESPECIALMENTE EN EL RUBRO DE AVIONES Y MISILES.

“LAS NACIONES DEL TERCER MUNDO QUE DESEAN COMPRAR O INCLUSO PRODUCIR ARMAS MAS SOFISTICADAS QUE RIFLES, AMETRALLADORAS O MORTEROS, DEPENDEN DE LA BUENA VOLUNTAD DE UNOS POCOS PAISES INDUSTRIALIZADOS. Y EN PARTICULAR LOS PAISES ESCASOS DE DIVISAS FUERTES, DEPENDEN DE LA BUENA VOLUNTAD DE AMBAS SUPER POTENCIAS”.

LA PARTICIPACION DE CHINA COMUNISTA EN EL COMERCIO DE ARMAS ES DE SOLO EL 2,2 POR CIENTO, AUNQUE PROPORCIONA ARMAS PEQUENAS Y ASESORAMIENTO MILITAR “A GRAN NUMERO DE PAISES Y MOVIMIENTOS REVOLUCIONARIOS DE AFRICA Y ASIA”.

